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Introduction
Independent films have become increasingly common
over recent years. Due in part to industry consolidation, the
number of available major studio deals is limited, and the
percentage of films backed by such studios is steadily
decreasing. Although' the studios spend billions of dollars
annually, they are hesitant to take the financial risks
associated with unproven filmmakers. Therefore, it has
become increasingly difficult for first-time filmmakers to
obtain studio financing.
Filmmakers who cannot obtain studio financing often
turn to private investors. Private investors typically contribute
money to the financing entity in exchange for an ownership
interest in the finished product. A filmmaker seeking private
investor financing must confront several legal issues. This
article will examine the choice of entity and securities law
aspects of independent film financing, and make suggestions
for the independent filmmaker facing these issues.
I
Choice of Entity
When choosing a business vehicle to produce a film, the
first step is to consider the respective goals of the filmmaker
and the potential investors. The filmmaker's primary concern
is raising capital. But another looming concern for the
filmmaker, particularly one who is trying to establish a
reputation, is control. The filmmaker does not want to
compromise his artistic integrity. Therefore, he will want a
vehicle that will allow him exclusive control over production.
Additionally, the filmmaker will want to protect the rights in
the film project from creditors. Finally, he will want limited
liability with regard to his personal assets. This is probably
secondary to his other concerns, as he may have few assets,
and therefore be virtually judgment proof. However, he will
probably want to protect his belongings, even if they are
relatively meager.
The investors' primary goal will be to share in the
potentially large returns of successful independent films.
While far more independent films are economic failures rather
than successes, those that are successful produce enormous
profits. Investors are also concerned with liability and are
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more likely to invest in ventures for which they are only
personally liable to the extent of their investments. To a
lessor degree, investors are also motivated by the egoistic
stimulation of investing in a successful film and being
associated with a promising young filmmaker.
Another motive for investors will be the tax losses that
the investment may produce. Historically, film limited
partnerships were a very attractive investment, as investors
could take tax losses well beyond their actual contribution.
However, the Tax Reform Act of 19861 reduced the ability to
write off losses of such leveraged investments. It did this in
two ways. First, it added the at risk rules of Section 465.2 The
net effect of those rules is that investors can only take losses
up to their actual contribution in a partnership.3 Additionally,
the Act limited investors' ability to write off limited
partnership losses with the passive activity loss rules of
Section 469. 4 A passive activity, for the purposes of
investment in a limited partnership, is defined as any activity
which involves the conduct of a trade or business in which
the taxpayer does not materially participate.5 By definition,
an interest in a limited partnership is not treated as an
interest in which the taxpayer materially participates.6 Losses
from passive activities can only be used to offset gains from
passive activities during the current year.7 To the extent such
losses exceed such gains, the taxpayer has a passive activity
loss for that year.8 Losses from passive activities are carried
over and treated as a deduction allocable to passive activity
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
2. I.R.C, § 465 (1994).
3. See id.
4. I.R.C. § 469 (1994).
5. SeeI.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (1994).
6. See I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (1994). Note that the current regulations provide a
limited exception to this general rule, which will probably not be applicable to
the financing limited partnership, for individuals who either: (1) participate in
the business activity for more than 500 hours during the taxable year; (2)
materially participated in the business activity during any five of the ten
preceding taxable years; or (3) materially participated in the business activity in
any three preceding taxable years, if the business activity was in the field of
health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing
arts, or consulting or any other trade or business in which capital is not a
material income-producing factor. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5T(e)(2) (1998).
7. See I.R.C. § 469(a)(1) (1994).
8. See I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (1994).
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income for the following year.9
Due to the at-risk rules' ° and the limitation on losses
from passive activities," modem limited partnership investors
are generally motivated more by the potential of profits than
by the tax consequences of losses. However, modem investors
who are involved in other passive activities, as many wealthy
investors are, will still want to invest in a vehicle that will
allow them to write off the losses against any passive activity
gains they may have during the tax year. Therefore, it is
important that the filmmaker choose an entity that will allow
such losses to flow through to the investors.
One way to accomplish the cumulative goals of the
filmmaker and the investors is through the formation of two
entities: one financing entity and one production entity. The
financing entity will be a limited partnership with the
filmmaker as the general partner, and the production entity
will be an S corporation with the filmmaker as the sole
shareholder. The financing entity will own the film rights, and
will contract with the production entity to produce the
picture, funding it on an as-needed basis. The production
entity will be solely responsible for all aspects of producing
the feature.
A limited partnership is an agreement between one or
more active general partners and one or more passive limited
partners to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. 2
Control rests primarily in the general partner. 3 General
partners are subject to unlimited personal liability for the
debts of the limited partnership. 4 The limited partners are
9. See I.R.C. § 469(b) (1994).
10. See I.R.C. § 465 (1994).
11. See I.R.C. § 469 (1994).
12. See Uniform Partnership Act § 6 [hereinafter UPA] (defining
"partnership" as association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit): Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 101(6) [hereinafter
RUPA] (same); Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 101(7) (1976) [hereinafter
ULPA] (defining "limited partnership" as partnership formed by two or more
persons having one or more general partners and one or more limited partners).
13. See ULPA, supra note 12, § 403 (1976).
14. See id. Note that limited liability limited partnerships provide for
centralized management in a general partner, while protecting that partner with
limited liability protection from the tortious actions of limited partners, similar
to the protection provided in a limited liability partnership. However, this
causes an inherent lack 6f disincentive for interference in management by
limited partners. This business vehicle is only available in a limited number of
[VOL. 22:65
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investors who generally are not personally liable for the debts
of the limited partnership and who are not expected to
participate in the day-to-day affairs of the limited
partnership.15 Therefore, a limited partner is ordinarily only
subject to lose what he has invested in the limited
partnership. However, a limited partner who participates in
management may be liable to persons who transact business
with the limited partnership based on the belief that the
limited partner is a general partner.'6 Oftentimes the threat of
unlimited liability is not enough to deter limited partners
from management participation. Therefore, it is customary to
place express restrictions on their activity in a formal written
agreement.
Prior to the passage of the check-the-box tax
regulations,1 7 determination of whether a limited partnership
would be taxed as a flow-through entity under the
partnership tax code provisions, or a double-taxation entity
under the corporate tax code provisions was made on a case-
by-case basis. This determination was made by analysis of
the partnership agreement under the Kintner regulations.'8
Because the limited partnership was a much more attractive
investment if taxed as a flow-through entity, limited
partnership agreements had to be tailored so that they would
satisfy the Kintner test.
The check-the-box regulations have made the
classification of limited partnerships for tax purposes a non-
issue. Under the check-the-box regulations, a limited
partnership may simply choose flow through taxation by
checking the appropriate box on its tax forms.' 9 The
regulations thus obviate the need to tailor the limited
partnership agreement to satisfy the Kintner regulations.
states.
15. See ULPA, supra note 12, § 303(a) (1976).
16. See id.
17. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1, 301.7701-2, 301.7701-3 (1998).
18. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3 (former). The Klntner Regulations were used
by the Internal Revenue Service prior to the check-the-box regulations to
determine the tax treatment of unincorporated entities with two or more
owners. They listed four crucial corporate characteristics that were considered
in determining whether the entity would be taxed as a corporation or a
partnership. The four characteristics were continuity of life, centralization of
management, limited liability and free transferability of interests. See id.
19. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3 (1998).
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Once the limited partnership checks the appropriate box,
profits and losses flow through to limited partners. Therefore,
investors can use losses from the limited partnership to offset
passive activity gains, while profits therefrom flow through
and avoid corporate double taxation.
An S corporation provides flow through taxation to all
shareholders while providing them with the limited liability
generally enjoyed by corporations. ° Only a small business
corporation may elect to be an S corporation. 2' A small
business corporation is defined in Section 1361(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code as a corporation that has: no more
than 75 shareholders; has only individuals, estates, certain
22 . 2trusts, or certain tax exempt organizations 3  as
shareholders; does not have any nonresident aliens as
shareholders, and only has one class of stock.24
An S corporation election requires the consent of all
persons who hold shares in the corporation on the day the
election is made.25 Once made, it continues indefinitely until
revoked voluntarily by a vote of more than 50 percent of the
shareholders,26 or involuntarily by the corporation's failure to
continually satisfy the requirements of a small business
corporation. 27 A corporation may move freely from S status,
but if it does so it can not return to S status for a period of
five years.2
20. See generally I.R.C. Subchapter S, §§ 1361-1368; 1371-1378 (1994).
21. See I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1) (1994).
22. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(B), 1361(c)(2)(A) (1994). The following trusts can
hold shares in an S corporation: trusts owned by residents or citizens of the
United States; trusts that were owned by residents or citizens of the United
States immediately prior to that person's death, for a two-year period beginning
with the date of the person's death; a trust to which S corporation stock was
transferred pursuant to a will, for the two-year period from the date of transfer;
a voting trust; and an electing small business trust. See id.
23. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(B), 1361(c)(6) (1994). Organizations exempt from
taxation under Section 501(a) of the Tax Code which are described in either
Section 401(a) or Section 501 (c)(3) of the Tax Code can be shareholders in an S
corporation.
24. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1994).
25. See I.R.C. § 1362(a)(2) (1994).
26. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1) (1994).
27. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2) (1994). Note that there are additional
circumstances under which an S election may be revoked, but they are not
relevant for the purpose of the production company S corporation discussed in
this paper.
28. See I.R.C. § 1362(g) (1994).
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Once the entities are formed, the financing limited
partnership, as owner of the film rights, will contract with the
S corporation to produce the film. The S corporation will have
sole discretion over the film's production. The limited
partnership will provide funds on an as needed basis to pay
for the costs of production, including a salary to the
filmmaker. The S corporation's compensation under the
contract will be provided on a deferred basis, so that it only
receives payment after the limited partners recoup their
investments.29
By establishing a financing limited partnership and an S
corporation production company, all of the goals of the
filmmaker and the. investors enumerated at the beginning of
this section can be accomplished. The filmmaker
accomplishes his primary goal of raising funding for his
project by selling interests in the financing vehicle. He retains
control of production by creating the separate. production
vehicle. He can hire himself as an employee of the production
corporation and pay himself a salary. That salary will be
funded as an expense of production by the financing vehicle.
By having the film rights belong to the financing limited
partnership, and by having the production company act as an
independent contractor of the financing limited partnership,
the film rights will be insulated from any liability arising from
production of the feature. 30 By virtue of the production
company's corporate form, the filmmaker will be personally
insulated from any liabilities associated with production.
Additionally, because the company is an S corporation, any
profit it receives from its contract to produce the fim will flow
through to shareholders rather than subject to double
taxation.
The goals of the investors are also satisfied by the dual
entity relationship. Because the limited partnership owns the
film rights, the profits from the film will be distributed to the
29. See infra pp. 92-93 (discussing deferral arrangements).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (providing that master is
liable for torts of his servants committed while acting in scope of their
employment); See id. § 220 (providing that servant is person employed to
perform services for another whose physical conduct in performance of services
is subject to control of other). Because the production company will be solely
responsible for the production, lacking any control by the financing limited
partnership, the financing limited partnership will not be responsible for any
torts associated with production. See id.
1999]
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partners. The limited partnership agreement can be arranged
so that the investors recoup their investment from the initial
returns to the limited partnership, and profits are then split
between the general partner and the limited partners.3' By
virtue of the limited partnership form, coupled with the
restrictions on limited partner involvement in management in
the limited partnership agreement, the limited partners will
only be liable to the extent of their investments. The
investments are further protected by the dual entity
arrangement, which insulates them from torts arising in
association with production.32 Any losses incurred by the
financing vehicle will flow through to the investors to offset
any gains they may have from passive activity. 33
II
Securities
Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 193334 (the
"Securities Act") and Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 3 (the "Exchange Act") define "security"
for the purpose of the Acts. Each definition includes, inter
alia, "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement" and "investment contract. ,3
6
"[P]articipation in [a] profit-sharing agreement" is no broader




In SEC v. Howey,"8 the Supreme Court articulated the
test for determining whether an instrument is an investment
contract. "[Ain investment contract for purposes of the
31. For example, film limited partnership agreements are often written so
that during the loss mode the general partner receives one percent of any
income, while the remaining ninety-nine percent is distributed among the
limited partners in accordance with their interests. Once the limited partners
recoup their investments, profits are typically split fifty-fifty between the general
partner and the limited partners, with the limited partners' portion then being
distributed among them in accordance with their interests.
32. See supra note 30.
33. The limited partnership agreement can be tailored so that the limited
partners receive all of the losses, which will then be distributed to them in
accordance with their interests.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1994).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1994).
36. 15 U.S.C. § § 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(i0) (1994).
37. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.
11(1979).
38. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party."39
The test thus contains four distinguishing factors: (1) an
investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; (3) the
expectation of profits; and (4) profits derived solely from the
efforts of others. This test is satisfied by the financing limited
partnership interests. There is an investment of money by the
limited partners. The common enterprise test is satisfied as
each investor's success is interwoven with that of the other
investors and the filmmaker.4 0 Even if the investment is made
primarily for tax purposes, a mere attempt to derive profit
satisfies the expectation of profits prong of the test.4 ' Finally,
because the limited partnership interests are passive
investments for the limited partners, their expectation of
profits is based solely on the efforts of others. Because the
limited partnership interests are securities, they must either
be registered under the Securities Act or qualified for an
39. Id. at 298-99.
40. Courts differ on whether the proper way to determine commonality of
enterprise is via a horizontal test or a vertical test. A horizontal test examines
whether the success of an individual's investment is dependent upon the
success of other investments in the same enterprise. For example, a venture in
which multiple investors' funds are pooled would satisfy the horizontal
commonality test. A determination of vertical commonality, on the other hand,
requires a finding that "the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and
dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of
third parties." SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1973); see also U.S. v. Holtzclaw, 950 F. Supp. 1306, 1314-15 (S.D. W. Va.
1997) (providing detailed explanation for horizontal and vertical commonality
tests and application of the horizontal test), vacated in part on different grounds,
131 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished decision); Hirk v. Agri-Research
Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying horizontal test); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482 n.7 (applying vertical test); SEC
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying
vertical test).
41. See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); McConnell
v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1983); SEC v.
International Mining Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1981).
42. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587 (D.C.- Cir. 1996) (providing
analysis of what is required to satisfy the "solely on the efforts of others" test);
see also James B. Porter, Note, Modem Partnership Interests as Securities: The
Effect of RUPA, RULPA, and LLP Statutes on Investment Contract Analysis, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 955 (1998) (providing analysis of when partnership
interest should be regarded as security).
19991 INDEPENDENT FILM OFFERINGS
74 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 22:65
exemption.43 A registered offering is commonly known as a
public offering, while an offering that qualifies for an
exemption is commonly known as a private placement.44
When available, private placement is advantageous for several
reasons, foremost of which is the time and expense involved
with public offerings.
At the federal level, public offerings generally require a
minimum of thirty to sixty days to be approved by the SEC,
depending on the SEC's backlog of filings at the time.45 This
time period allows the SEC to approve the disclosures in the
prospectus. The prospectus must also be approved by the
regulators of each state involved in the offering.4" No such
advance regulatory approval is required for private
placements.
There are also several expenses associated with public
offerings that are not factors in private placements.48 Lawyers
must spend more time on prospectuses for public offerings
because they require a greater amount of time in research
and drafting than private placement offering memoranda.
Accounting fees are also much higher for a public offering
because more financial disclosure is required.
Underwriting fees are also higher for public offerings. The
National Association of Securities Dealers' standard of
fairness limits the underwriting fees that can be charged for a
public offering.49 These fees generally run slightly over ten
percent of the offering amount. Although the fair practice
rules do not limit the underwriting fees associated with
private placements, the use of an underwriter is not always
necessary for such an offering. To the extent it is necessary,
the market prevents commissions from being excessive.
Sophisticated investors know that the cost of underwriting
detracts from the dollar amount that will be applied to the
43. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
44. See John W. Cones, Feature Film Limited Partnerships: A Practical Guide
Focusing on Securities and Marketing for Independent Producers and their
Attorneys, 12 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. J. 19, 25 (1992).
45. See id. at 26.
46. See id.
47. See id. Note that state regulators often piggyback their approval of the
prospectus onto that of the SEC.
48. See WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC & PRIVATE OFFERINGS §§ 1:11-
1:12, 1-22 (1983).
49. See Rules of Fair Practice, Appendix F, § 5 NASD Manual l 2192.
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actual making of the motion picture, therefore, investors will
typically shy away from placements where the underwriter's
fees are too high. °
Printing costs incurred in public offerings are also
markedly higher than those associated with private
placements. Generally, fewer investors are involved in a
private placement, and therefore fewer disclosure documents
have to be printed. Additionally, a private placement offering
memorandum is less detailed than a public offering
prospectus, and offering memorandums are therefore shorter.
A. Exemptions from Registration
Given the increased cost and time associated with public
offerings, a private placement is much more attractive for an
independent filmmaker. Therefore, the filmmaker should seek
an exemption from securities registration. Which exemption
is most suitable will depend on the circumstances of the
offering. The following is a survey of federal exemptions. Note,
however, that unlike most other business activities, the sale
of securities is regulated by both federal and state law.5'
Thus, filmmakers must comply with both regimes. 2 In the
event of a conflict between the applicable state and federal
securities provisions, dual regulation requires the filmmaker
to ascertain and comply with the more stringent standard.53
1. Regulation D and Section 4(2)
Regulation D,54 encompassing Rules 501 through 508 of
the Securities Act, provides three of several exemptions
available at the federal level. The Regulation D exemptions
are found in Rules 504,55 50556 and 506. . Rules 504 and 505
50. See Cones, supra note 44, at 27.
51. Note that Securities Act Section 18 preempts state law with regard to
certain securities exempted from registration under certain federal provisions.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994).
52. Note, however, as will be discussed infra, that Securities Act Section 18
dictates that federal law preempts state law when certain federal exemptions
from registration are employed.
53. See Cones, supra note 44, at 25.
54. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 (1999).
55. 17 C.F.R § 230.504 (1999).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1999).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1999).
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implement Section 3(b) 8 of the Exchange Act, while
Regulation 506 implements Section 4(2)59 of that Act. Note
that these exemptions are non-exclusive, and can therefore
be used in conjunction with other exemptions. Attorneys
often aim to qualify placements for multiple exemptions as a
safeguard, because the exemptions sometimes require such
detail that something may be overlooked.
There are two requirements that apply to all Regulation D
exemptions. The first is that Form D must be filed with the
SEC. 60 The second is that Regulation D offerings must be
integrated under Rule 502(a).6' This means that for an
offering to qualify for a Regulation D exemption, all offers and
sales within six months, before the start of the offering or
after its completion must collectively comply with Regulation
D.
Rule 504 was passed pursuant to Securities Act Section
3(b). 2 This section allows the Commission to exempt any
class of securities where enforcement is not necessary to the
public interest.63 The section limits the aggregate amount of
any offering exempted thereunder to $5,000,000.64
Although the maximum aggregate offering amount under
Section 3(b) is $5,000,000, Rule 504 has a maximum
aggregate offering amount of $1,000,000.65 The $1,000,000
limitation applies to the aggregate of all securities sold in the
purported 504 offering, plus any other securities sold in
reliance on any exemption under Section 3(b) within twelve
months before, or during, the purported 504 offering. Note
that this would cover securities sold in reliance on Rule 505,
as well as any sold in reliance on Rule 504, during the given
time period. Note 1 to Rule 504 illustrates the limitation with
the following example:
If an issuer sold $900,000 on June 1, 1987 under this
§ 230.504 or [Rule 504] and an additional $4,100,000 on
December 1, 1987 under § 230.505 or [Rule 505], the
issuer could not sell any of its securities under this
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (A) (1999).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1999).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2000).
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§ 230.504 or [Rule 504] until December 1, 1988. Until then
the issuer must count the December 1, 1987 sale towards
the $ 1,000,000 limit within the preceding twelve months.6
Under the conditions of the example, if an issuer wanted
to sell securities between December 1, 1987 and December 1,
1988, it could not use Rule 504 to exempt that sale from
registration. However, the sale of securities during that time
period would not affect the availability of Rule 504 for any
previous offerings.
Under the best case scenario, the complexity of the
$1,000,000 limitation should not be an issue for the
independent filmmaker. A filmmaker who runs out of funding
would not want to take the time to raise additional funds
through the sale of securities, as this would likely require the
filmmaker to shut down production in the interim. Among
other things, shutting down in the middle of production may
cause conflicts in the schedules of members of talent which
might prevent completion of the film. Therefore, a filmmaker
who finds himself in need of additional funds during
production should probably seek a more immediate source of
funding. A filmmaker who is not confident that $1,000,000
will be enough to complete production should be wary of
choosing Rule 504 as an exemption.
Until recently, Rule 504 provided a very attractive
exemption to filmmakers who were confident that a
$1,000,000 placement would provide them with sufficient
capital for production. The rule lacked a specific disclosure
requirement aside from the filing of a simple form, while
permitting advertisement and unrestricted transferability of
investors' interests. The allowance of general solicitation and
advertisement was significant to filmmakers who did not have
an established network of potential investors, since there is
no established market for limited partnership interests in a
vehicle in which success is contingent on the ability of an
unproven filmmaker. Advertisement, therefore, can provide a
filmmaker with a means to attract investment where one
would not otherwise exist. The lack of a cumbersome
disclosure requirement reduced the cost of a placement. Note,
however, that some disclosure was always necessary because
66. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504, note 1 (1999).
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504, note 2 (1999).
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of Exchange Act Rule lOb-5"8 and similar anti-fraud
provisions.6 9 Free transferability was also an attractive feature
for investors, as it provided a means for investors to liquidate
their investment if they could find a buyer. This attractive
feature, however, is of little practical value to independent
film limited partners because the lack of an established
market makes alienation difficult.
The SEC recently amended Rule 504, citing fraudulent
secondary transactions under the rule. ° Amended Rule 504
eliminates the combination of limited disclosure with
permissible advertisement and free transferability. Under the
amended Rule, general solicitation and advertisement will
only be permitted, and securities will only be "freely tradable"
if they are either: "(1) registered under state law requiring
public filing and delivery of a disclosure document to
investors before sale[;] or (2) exempted under state law
permitting general solicitation and advertising so long as
sales are made only to accredited investors."
71
This amendment severely limits the attractiveness of Rule
504 to a first-time filmmaker. In order to register securities
pursuant to a state law requiring a public filing and the
delivery of a disclosure document to each investor, the
filmmaker would have to incur many of the same expenses
that would be required in a public offering. The expense
makes this option virtually impractical, particularly if the
securities will be sold in a state that has onerous disclosure
requirements.
The second option under the amended rule is more
practical, as it permits general solicitation without requiring
potentially onerous disclosure. However, it places three forms
of limitation that may make it less attractive than other
exemptions. First, it limits the states in which the securities
can be placed. Not all states provide exemptions under which
general solicitation and advertisement is permitted. 2 Second,
by limiting purchasers to accredited investors, it limits the
market for the placement. Finally, as a corollary to the limit
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240..10b-5 (1999).
69. See infra pp. 77-82 (discussing disclosure requirements).
70. See SEC Release No. 33-7644 (last modified February 25, 1999), as
published at <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7644.txt>.
71. Id.
72. See 1 BLUE SKY REGULATION § 5.03(9)(g) (MB 1999).
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on the market for the placement, it also limits the liquidity of
the securities in the hands of the initial investors, thus
increasing the cost of capital. Because the transfer of the
securities will also be limited to accredited investors, they will
not actually be freely transferable.
Rule 505 was also passed pursuant to Section 3(b) of the
Exchange Act.73 Rule 505 has a maximum aggregate offering
limitation of $5,000,000, which applies to all securities sold
in reliance on any exemption under Section 3(b) within twelve
months before the start of or during the purported 505
offering.74 This limitation is applied in the same manner as
the $1,000,000 limitation in Rule 504.75
Although Rule 505 allows the issuer to raise more capital
than Rule 504, offerings exempted under Rule 505 are
subject to some significant limitations and requirements that
offerings under Rule 504 are not. Under Rule 505(b)(2)(ii), a
Rule 505 placement can have no more than thirty-five
unaccredited investors.76 Although there are eight classes of
accredited investors, only two of those classes contain
persons likely to invest in the financing limited partnership.77
The first includes any natural person whose individual net
worth, or joint net worth with the individual's spouse,
exceeds $1,000,000 at the time of purchase.78 The other
includes any natural person who had an individual income
over $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or a joint
income with the person's spouse over $300,000 in each of
those years, and has a reasonable expectation of achieving
that level of income during the current year.79 Rule 501
provides a safety net for the issuer, such that a purchaser
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i) (1999).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i), notes 1 & 2 (1999).
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (1999); see also 17 C.F.R. §
230.505(b)(2)(ii) (2000).
77. The classes of investors who qualify as accredited investors, but who are
not considered applicable to the subject of this paper, include: certain
institutional investors, private business development companies; certain tax
exempt organizations; directors, executive officers or general partners of the
issuer, or directors, executive officers or general partners of a general partner of
the issuer; certain trusts; and any entity in which all of the equity owners are
accredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(4), (7)-(8) (1999).
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(5) (1999).
79. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (1999).
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qualifies as an accredited investor so long as the issuer
reasonably believes that he satisfies one of the enumerated
categories. 80 An offering exempted under Rule 505 may have
an unlimited number of accredited investors.8'
Because filmmakers using the Rule 505 exemption will
not be subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange
Act, they will be required to make certain disclosures to
unaccredited investors." These disclosures include both
financial statement and non-financial statement information.
An issuer's financial statement disclosure requirement
83depends upon the amount of money it intends to raise. 3 A
filmmaker wishing to raise up to $2,000,000 will be required
to provide the information required by Item 310 of Regulation
S-B.84 However, for the purposes of a placement under Rule
505, the interim balance sheet required by Item 310 must be
audited and dated within 120 days of the start of the
offering.85 A filmmaker wishing to raise between $2,000,000
and $5,000,000 will be required to provide the information
mandated by Form SB-2.88 However, because the financing
vehicle is a limited partnership, the filmmaker may furnish
financial statements "prepared on the basis of Federal income
tax requirements and reported on in accordance with
generally accepted accounting standards by an independent
80. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1999).
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (1999) (excluding accredited investors
from calculation of number of purchasers for purpose of Rule 505(b)).
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2) (1999). Note that the language "to the
extent material to an understanding of the issuer, its business and the
securities being offered," in 17 § C.F.R. 230.502(b)(2)(i) probably only applies in
very limited circumstances such that the unaccredited investor is affiliated with
the issuer in a way that he has access to the information that the issuer would
otherwise have to disclose to him. Note also that reporting companies under the
Exchange Act are required to make disclosures under Rule 505, but may do so
by way of reference to their Exchange Act filings. See id.
83. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B) (1999).
84. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)(1) (1999). Regulation S-B generally lists
disclosure requirements for small business issuers. For the purpose of the
financing limited partnership, Item 310 would require the issuer to provide the
following: an audited balance sheet dated within 120 days of the start of the
issue; audited statements of income, cash flow and changes in owners' equity;
and a balance sheet for the filmmaker, which does not have to be audited. The
foregoing assumes that the offering will be made within one year of the creation
of the financing limited partnership. See 17 C.F.R. § 228.310 (1999).
85. See id.




public or certified accountant" in lieu of the statements
required by Form SB-2 if obtaining the required statements
would involve "unreasonable effort and expense.""7
An issuer's non-financial statement disclosure
requirements depend upon its eligibility to use Regulation A.
An issuer who is eligible to use Regulation X' must disclose
the information required by Part II of Form 1-A. 9 The
financing limited partnership will qualify for Regulation A
unless the filmmaker has been caught committing securities
fraud within the ten years prior to the placement. ° If an
issuer is not eligible to use Regulation A, it must disclose all
of the information that would be required in Part I of the
applicable registration statement.
Securities exempted under Rule 505 are also subject to
additional limitations. The issuer may not use general
solicitation and advertisement to sell the securities." This
means that the market for the securities will be limited to
people with whom the filmmaker has a pre-existing
relationship. Securities issued under Rule 505 may not be
resold without being registered, unless the resale qualifies for
a separate exemption.92 Finally, the Rule 505 exemption will
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(2) (1999).
88. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1999). Regulation A
provides a separate exemption from registration under the Securities Act. It will
not be discussed in this paper because it entails filings whose expense will
make it impractical for use by the financing limited partnership. To qualify for
Regulation A, an issuer: must be organized under the laws of a state, territory
or possession of the United States or Canada; cannot be subject to the reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act; cannot be a development stage company
which has no specific business plan, or whose only business plan is to merge
with unidentified companies; cannot be a company registered or required to be
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940; cannot be issuing
certain interests in oil, gas or mineral rights; and cannot be disqualified by Rule
262, which primarily disqualifies those who have committed securities fraud in
recent years. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251, 230.262 (1999).
89. Part II of Form 1-A is an offering circular. Form 1-A provides two model
forms for the offering circular. The requirements relating to the offering circular
are located in Rules 253 and 255. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.253, 230.255 (1999).
90. Note that if the general partner would be disqualified from using
Regulation A by Rule 262, the financing limited partnership would not be
eligible to use the Rule 505 exemption under Rule 505(b)(2)(iii). See 17 C.F.R. §§
230.262, 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1999).
91. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1999).
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1999). See also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144,
230.144A (1999) (providing safe harbor provisions under which restricted
securities may be sold).
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not be available if the filmmaker or its underwriter has been
guilty of certain securities-related violations.93 Therefore, if a
person who has committed such a violation sells the interests
in the financing limited partnership, the filmmaker may be
criminally liable for the sale of unregistered securities.
Securities Act section 4(2)94 allows an issuer an exemption
from registration for securities that are not issued via a
public offering. However, little guidance exists on the actual
implementation of the section. Therefore, securities
practitioners do not invoke Section 4(2) often, except as a
safety net if they find that they have failed to meet the
requirements of another section.
Rule 506 .is a safe harbor provision under Section 4(2)."5
Like Rule 505, Rule 506 offerings may have thirty-five
unaccredited investors and an unlimited number of
accredited investors. 6 In addition, in a Rule 506 placement
the issuer must reasonably believe that each purchaser who
is not an accredited investor is capable of evaluating the risks
and merits of the investment, either alone or with the aid of a
purchase representative.97 Rule 506 also contains the same
prohibitions on resale and general solicitation and
advertisement as Rule 505.98
The disclosure requirements under Rule 506 are the
same as those under Rule 505 for non-financial statement
information and for financial statement information in
offerings up to $2,000,000.99 The financial statement
information disclosure requirement for a Rule 506 placement
from $2,000,000 to $7,500,000 is the same as that for a Rule
505 offering from $2,000,000 to $5,000,000. '00 If a Rule 506
offering is made for over $7,500,000, the issuer must disclose
the same financial statement information as would be
required in an applicable registration statement for a public
offering.101 Once again, however, because the financing vehicle
93. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(i1), 230.262 (1999).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
95. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(1) (1999).
96. See id.
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (1999).
98. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c), (d) (1999).
99. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)()(A), (B)(1) (1999).
100. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B)(2) (1999).
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)()(B)(3) (1999).
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is a limited partnership, it may provide financial statements
prepared on the basis of federal income tax requirements and
reported in accordance with generally accepted accounting
standards by an independent public or certified
accountant.'02
One advantage to Rule 506 over the other Regulation D
exemptions is that a Rule 506 offering is exempt from state
regulation under Securities Act section 18.103 Therefore, if an
offering is being made in a state with particularly rigorous
registration requirements, Rule 506 may be preferential to
other Regulation D exemptions, regardless of the size of the
offering.
Rule 508104 provides an advantage over other Regulation
D exemptions. With regard to non-Regulation D placements,
one offer or sale that does not satisfy the requirements of the
exemption can disqualify the entire placement. However, Rule
508 provides that insignificant deviations from the
requirements of Regulation D will not disqualify the
placement, provided that a good faith effort was made to
comply with the requirement. 5 This provides the issuer with
room to make minor errors without losing the exemption. In
contrast, even the slightest deviation from any of the other
exemptions from registration disqualifies the entire placement
from use thereof.
2. Securities Act Section 4(6)
Section 4(6)106 also provides an exemption for non-public
offerings. However, Section 4(6) requires that placements
thereunder only be offered and sold to accredited investors.'7
Because filmmakers usually will not know in advance of
making any offer whether they will be able to raise the
102. See id.
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1996).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (1999).
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a) (1999). For Section 508 to save the
exemption from disqualification, the failure to comply: cannot pertain to a
requirement directly intended to protect the particular Investor; must be
insignificant to the offering as a whole, provided that failure to comply with Rule
502(c), Rule 504(b)(2), Rule 505(b)(2)(i) and (ii) or Rule 506(b)(2)(i) shall be
deemed per se significant; and must be in spite of a good faith effort and
reasonable attempt by the issuer to comply. See id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1994).
107. See id.
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necessary funds exclusively from accredited investors, this is
probably not a worthwhile exemption for them to rely upon.'08
It should therefore only be turned to as a safety net in the
event that the filmmaker fails to satisfy the requirements of
another exemption.
3. Securities Act Section 3(a)(1 1) and Rule 147
Section 3(a)(1 ) 09 exempts securities from registration"0
that are part of an issue offered and sold only to persons
residing within the state in which the issuer is a resident and
doing business. This exemption is premised on the idea that
residents of the issuer's state are sufficiently local to
investigate any claims made by the issuer in its offering
documents, and that state law provides sufficient oversight of
intrastate placements. Like Section 4(2), there is little
guidance for the implementation of Section 3(a)(11)."' In
response to complaints to that effect, the SEC promulgated
Rule 147 '12 as a safe harbor provision for the implementation
of Section 3(a)(11).
Rule 147 provides guidelines for determining the
residence and place of business of offerors, and the residence
of offerees and purchasers. For the purpose of the financing
limited partnership, it will be a resident in the state under
whose laws it was organized.13 A partnership will be deemed
to be doing business in that state if it has at least 80% of its
assets located in the state, it intends to use at least 80% of
the net proceeds from the sale of securities issued under Rule
147 in the state, and its principal office is located within the
108. See Cones, supra note 44, at 28.
109. 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(11) (1994).
110. Although section 3 asserts that it removes securities described
thereunder from all of the provisions of the Securities Act, that assertion is
prefaced by "[e]xcept as hereinafter expressly provided." Id. By virtue of that
phrase and the language of other provisions in the Act, 3(a)(9), (10) and (11) are
only exempted from the Act's registration requirements. It is therefore often said
that these subsections are misplaced, and would be better located in Section 4.
111. For example, the statutory section does not contain any bright-line
provision for determining whether an issuer is resident and doing business in a
state. While case law does provide some guidance for the implementation of
Section 3(a)(1 1), practitioners who wish to make use of the intrastate exemption
will generally try to qualify the placement for the safe harbor under Rule 147.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1999).
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(1) (1999).
(VOL. 22:65
state."4 Because of these requirements, a filmmaker should
only rely on this exemption for sale of financing limited
partnership interests if he plans to shoot the picture via the
production company within the state as well. ' 15 An individual
offeree or purchaser is deemed to be a resident of the state in
which his principal residence is located at the time of the
offer and sale."6 A business-organization purchaser is
deemed to be a resident in the state in which its principal
office is located at the time of the offer or sale"7 unless it was
organized for the specific purpose of investing in the offer, in
which case it is only a resident in the state if all of its
beneficial owners are residents of the state.
1' 8
Because of the intrastate nature of the Rule 147
exemption, securities issued thereunder cannot be resold to
persons not resident in the state for the nine month period
following the date of the last sale made under the issue. '
Also, because of the intrastate nature of the exemption, the
rule mandates that issuers take precautions to avoid
interstate offers and sales. 2 ° These include placing a legend
on the document evidencing the security, issuing stop
transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent, if such an
agent exists, and obtaining written representations from each
purchaser regarding his residence.' 2 '
Note that neither Section 3(a)( 11) or Rule 147 contains a
per se prohibition on general solicitation and advertisement.
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2) (1999). (Note that Rule 147(c)(2)(i) will not
apply to the financing limited partnership because it will not have revenues in
excess of $5,000 at the time of offer or sale of the limited partnership interests).
115. See, e.g., Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 657-58 (10th Cir. 1987). (If
the film is shot out of state, the filmmaker will not satisfy the requirement that
80% of the proceeds be used within the state.).
116. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d)(2) (1999).
117. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d)(1) (1999).
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d)(3) (1999).
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1999). Note that Rule 147(b) contains an
integration clause similar to that provided by Rule 502(a). Under that clause,
securities issued pursuant to exemptions provided by Section 3 or Section 4(2)
either more than six months prior to the Rule 147 issue or more than six
months after the Rule 147 issue are deemed not to be part of the Rule 147
issue. For the purpose of Rule 147(e), the date of the last sale made under an
issue will be the date of the last sale integrated with the issue under Rule
147(b).
120. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(f) (1999).
121. See id.
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However, the requirement that offers only be made to
intrastate residents acts as a quasi-prohibition on such
solicitations. An issuer will lose the exemption if it is not clear
that the solicitation is only being made to intrastate
residents. Therefore, to avoid risking disqualification from the
exemption, the issuer may wish to avoid general solicitation
and advertisement. At a minimum, the issuer must limit the
manner of any solicitation to eliminate any question that the
offer is being made to out-of-state residents.
It is likely that the financing limited partnership will be
organized in either New York or California. Because these
states have high concentrations of wealth and are the centers
of the entertainment industry in America, they are also the
states in which potential investors will most likely be found.
The nine-month limitation on resale is probably
inconsequential to potential investors due to the lack of an
established market for the limited partnership interests.
Therefore, Rule 147 provides an attractive exemption for the
filmmaker who intends to shoot his film in either New York or
California.
4. Rule 1001
Rule 1001 was promulgated under Securities Act Section
3(b). The rule exempts certain issues that satisfy Section
25102(n) of the California Corporations Code from the federal
registration requirements. 122 The rule qualifies that exemption
by placing a $5,000,000 aggregate limit on the consideration
received for securities sold under such an issue.1
23
For a financing limited liability partnership to satisfy the
conditions of Section 25102(n), it must be organized under
California law.'24 It would also have to restrict limited
partnership interest sales to qualified persons. 125 "Qualified
purchasers" include individuals who meet the qualifications
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001(a) (1999).
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001(b) (1999). (Note that the language "less the
aggregate offering price of all other securities sold in the same offering of
securities, whether pursuant to this or another provision" provides for
integration with regard to the $5,000,000 limitation).
124. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(1) (Supp. 1999). Section 25102(n) is
available to entities organized under California law and certain corporations
that, due to their high amount of activity within the state, are subject to
California law under Section 2115 of the California Corporate Code. See id.
125. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(2) (Supp. 1999).
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for accredited investors under Regulation D. The class of
qualified purchasers also includes individuals who purchase
more than $150,000 of the limited partnership interests,
provided that they either: 1) alone or with an advisor have the
expertise necessary to protect their interest with regard to the
investment; or 2) are wealthy enough that the investment
does not exceed 10% of their net worth.'26 As long as the
filmmaker only sells the interests to such people, there will be
no specific disclosure requirement.
27
Under Section 25102(n), the filmmaker may publish a
general statement announcing the sale of the limited
partnership interests. 28 If such an announcement is
published, it must contain: the name of the financing limited
partnership;' 29 the title of the securities; 130 the anticipated
suitability standards for prospective purchasers; a
statement that no money is being solicited and that a
showing of interest by the prospective purchaser will not
obligate him in any way;' 32 and a legend which states how
additional information can be obtained.'33 The announcement
may also contain a brief description of the issuer,'34 the
geographic location of the issuer and its business' 3' and the
price of the security or the method for determining the
price."' inclusion of each of these options may be helpful in
attracting investors. A description of the issuer simply
126. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999). Entities in which all
of the equity owners individually meet certain aspects of the definition of
qualified purchasers are also qualified for the purposes of Section 25102(n).
There are numerous aspects of the definition of qualified persons that are
probably inapplicable for the purpose of the financing limited partnership.
127. If the interests are sold to any individual specified in Section 260.102.13
of Title 10 of the California Code of Regulations, the disclosure statement
specified in Section 25102(n)(4) is not required. See CAL. CORP. CODE §
25102(n)(4) (Supp. 1999).
128. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5) (Supp. 1999).
129. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. 1999).
130. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102n)(5)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1999).
131. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1999).
132. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(A)(iv) (Supp. 1999).
133. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(A)(vi) (Supp. 1999). The legend must
read as follows: "For more complete information about (Name of Issuer) and
(Full Title of Security), send for additional information from (Name and Address)
by sending this coupon or calling (Telephone Number)." Id.
134. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. 1999).
135. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1999).
136. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1999).
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provides more up-front information about the security to the
potential purchaser and may pique his interest. It may be
helpful to include the geographic location of the issuer and its
business in announcements sent locally, as the potential
purchaser may see the investment, from an altruistic as well
as an egocentric viewpoint, as an opportunity to bolster the
local economy. Inclusion of the price or the method for its
determination may limit the number of fruitless calls from
investors who are not willing to pay the asking price for the
security, in addition to providing material information to
potential investors.
A filmmaker using this exemption will be required to file
two notices of the transaction with the California
commissioner. 137 The first must be filed at the earlier of the
initial publication of the general announcement or the initial
offer of the securities.' 8 That filing must be accompanied by a
filing fee.'39 The second notice must be filed within ten
business days of the close or abandonment of the offering. 4 °
Additionally, the second notice must be filed within 210 days
of the filing of the first notice.'4 ' This rule places an inherent
limitation on the amount of time the filmmaker can keep his
offering open.
Until the filmmaker determines that a prospective
purchaser is a qualified person, the general announcement is
the only type of solicitation that may be employed.'42 After
such determination, other methods of solicitation, including
telephone, may be used.'4 3 However, any solicitation of a non-
qualified person beyond the publication of the general
announcement may disqualify the offering from the use of
Section 25102(n).'44
Rule 1001 presents a nice alternative to Rules 505 and
506 for filmmakers who are willing to organize the financing
limited partnership under California law, and for whom
$5,000,000 will be sufficient. Although the filmmaker may





142. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(C), (D), 25102(n)(6) (Supp. 1999).
143. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(6) (Supp. 1999).
144. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(n)(5)(D) (Supp. 1999).
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only sell to qualified persons under Rule 1001, the ability to
publish a general announcement provides the means to
locate such persons. Because it is unlikely that the entire
offering amount can be raised from thirty-five unaccredited
investors, this presents an attractive alternative to
filmmakers who do not have a pre-existing relationship with
enough accredited investors to raise the necessary funds
without disqualifying his offering from use of Rule 505 or
506. Alternatively, a filmmaker who has a preexisting
relationship with accredited investors may wish to forgo the
general announcement and attempt to satisfy both Rule 1001
and one of the Regulation D exemptions, this providing a
safety net in case an oversight disqualifies him from the
ability to use one or the other. 
4 5
B. The Offering Memorandum
Regardless of the specific level of disclosure required for
an offering, the practical effect of anti-fraud rules, such as
Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 46 is to require full disclosure of all
material risks associated with investment in a security. In
private placements, this is done by way of a written document
usually referred to as an offering memorandum. An offering
memorandum has been defined as follows:
A securities disclosure document usually associated with a
private placement offering, i.e., an offering which is being
conducted in reliance on available exemptions from the
federal and state securities registration requirements. This
is the document provided to potential investors in a film
limited partnership. It normally contains information on the
proposed investment, the terms and conditions under
which it is offered, the risks involved, the federal tax
consequences of the investment.... 147
Offering memorandums have a decisively pessimistic tone
because they are disclosure documents. It is important for
filmmakers to remember that these disclosures are required
by law, and any attempt to hide material facts or risks may
result in liability. Additionally, sophisticated investors are
accustomed to being presented with such documents.
145. Note that in these circumstances the filmmaker may also be able to
invoke Securities Act Section 4(6) as a safety net.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
147. JOHN W. CONES, FILM FINANCE & DISTRIBUTION: A DICTIONARY OF TERMS
339 (1992).
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Therefore, they may be skeptical of a document that does not
disclose the risky nature of the investment. Because the
offering memorandum is a disclosure document, there is an
inherent requirement that it be written in language that is
easily understandable. A discussion of some of the
disclosures that should be made by a first time filmmaker in
an offering memorandum for the financing of his feature
project follows. Note that some circumstances which may
merit disclosure are not discussed below.
The offering memorandum should make it clear to those
reading it that the security is being offered subject to an
exemption from registration. A disclaimer to that effect might
read as follows:
These securities are offered pursuant to an exemption from
registration with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Commission does not pass upon the
merits of any (of these) securities, nor does it pass upon the
accuracy or completeness of any offering or other selling
literature. 1
48
The disclaimer is important for several reasons. Rightly or
wrongly, many people are less skeptical about investments
that have been through the review and comment procedure
associated with SEC registration. To that extent, the fact that
the disclosures made in connection with the exempted
offering have not been reviewed by the SEC may be material
to investors. Additionally, disclosure that securities are
offered under an exemption puts investors on notice tlat
there is some resultant restraint on alienation. This
disclaimer should therefore make an investor aware that he
must further investigate whether alienation will require
subsequent registration.
A registration portion of the offering memorandum will be
dedicated to disclosing the risks associated with the
investment. Perhaps chief among these risks will be that this
is the filmmaker's first project. There are several areas in
which the filmmaker's inexperience elevates the risk
associated with the investment. A first-time filmmaker
generally has few or no preexisting relationships with
industry insiders. Nor does he have a reputation within the
industry. This may make it difficult to attract some of the
148. RENEE HARMON, THE BEGINNING FILMMAKER'S BUSINESS GUIDE: FINANCIAL,
LEGAL, MARKETING, AND DISTRIBUTION BASICS OF MAKING MOVIES 19 (1994).
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essential elements of a successful feature, such as talent and
distributors. In addition, investors may be wary of a
filmmaker who has no experience negotiating deals with
those groups. Finally, the filmmaker's inexperience in
overseeing and coordinating the various aspects of producing
a feature increases the risk of the investment. For example,
such inexperience could lead to failure to complete
production on schedule. This in turn may cause the film to go
over budget and may cause conflicts with the schedules of
cast and crew.
The offering memorandum should also discuss the
speculative and competitive nature of the film industry. There
are several factors beyond the filmmaker's control that may
affect the film's performance. For example, the popularity of
other films at the time may make it less likely that people will
be willing to spend their leisure money on the filmmaker's
feature. People with limited budgets might therefore be more
likely to only spend their money on the more popular film.
Additionally, poor reviews or lack of word of mouth can be
devastating to a feature's performance.
Similarly, the status of the economy at the time of the
film's release may affect its performance. The release date can
be controlled to a certain extent, but a prolonged recession
may necessitate release at a time when the public is not
willing to spend large amounts of money on leisure activities.
Although film attendance, which is a relatively cheap form of
entertainment, may not generally feel the same degree of
effect as other forms of leisure, it is still likely to suffer from
economic recession. This is particularly true with regard to
low-budget pictures, as people who do attend films during a
recession are more likely to see those with higher advertising
budgets.
Inexperienced filmmakers may also have difficulty
obtaining distribution agreements. This may force them to
deal with an independent, rather than a major, distribution
company. Since distribution is such a crucial factor in a
film's success, the fact that a filmmaker does not have a
distribution agreement, as well as the fact that he may be
forced to deal with an independent distribution company,
should be disclosed to offerees.
Similarly, if the filmmaker has any preexisting
relationship with any film festival, that relationship should be
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disclosed. Presenting the film at festivals is often a means for
obtaining a distribution agreement. 4 ' Festivals are accessible
because their success depends on attracting as many
distributors and features as possible.' 50 Still, many festivals
limit their showings to films that have not been premiered
elsewhere.' The festivals that do so may be more successful
at attracting distributors, since distributors do not want to
see the same film multiple times. Because some festivals are
more successful at attracting distributors, and, therefore,
more prestigious, any preexisting relationship with a
particular festival will be material to investors' decision
whether to invest.
Additionally, the public's opinion of the film's talent will
factor into its box office performance. Although a filmmaker
can be careful to choose talent whose persona are marketable
at the time of casting, the public's image of talent can change
rapidly due to circumstances beyond the filmmaker's control,
such as poor performances in other films, arrests and affairs,
to name a few.'52
Another factor that should be disclosed in the offering
memorandum is the competitive advantage that films backed
by major studios have over independent films. Unlike first-
time filmmakers, major studios have preexisting relationships
with talent. They also have an established reputation which
may enhance their access to theaters. Most importantly, they
have the money to carry a project from inception to
distribution without running out of funding.
A section on the distribution of proceeds should also be
included in the offering memorandum. As with typical
businesses, proceeds will initially go to any unpaid expenses
and to set up a reserve for future expenses, if necessary.
Proceeds are then distributed according to any level 1 deferral
arrangements. 153 Investors then receive distributions,
149. See Mark Litwak, Tactics and Strategy in Negotiating the Independent
Distribution Agreement: Part 1, 16 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 11, 12 (Winter 1999).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. It is questionable, however, whether these things are in fact damaging,
or whether the publicity they generate may actually prove beneficial to a low-
budget film.
153. So called because they are the first deferrals paid, and because they are
paid before the investors receive distributions to recoup their investments,
giving them 'level 1' priority status with regard to payment.
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commonly in the ratio of ninety-nine percent to the limited
partners and one percent to the general partner until the
limited partners recoup their investment. After the limited
partners are repaid for their investment, level 2 deferrals
1 54
are paid. Finally, the remaining proceeds are divided between
the general partner and the limited partners, usually on a
fifty-fifty basis.
Deferrals are arrangements by which all or a portion of
compensation for cast and crew is paid on a deferred basis,
usually after release of the film. 155 Inherent in this concept is
the fact that deferrals are contingent on sufficient revenue for
payment to be made.'56 The deferred party thus participates
with the investors in the risk of the film's failure. As indicated
above, payment may be made before or after the return of the
investor's contribution. There is conflict inherent in the effect
of this arrangement on an offeree's decision whether to
invest. On one hand, the venture may be more attractive to
an offeree if his investment will be recouped before cast and
crew are paid. On the other hand, the investor may prefer
that cast and crew are paid first. That will increase the
likelihood that payment will actually be made to the cast and
crew, thus making it more likely that talented cast and crew
will be attracted to the project. Talented cast and crew can
make the feature more successful, thus increasing the
likelihood that the investor's initial contribution will be
returned, and that the film will produce profits.
The investor may be more comfortable with the dual
entity arrangement if compensation to the production
company is made as a level 2 deferral. This is consistent with
the arrangement for distribution of proceeds whereby they
recoup their investment before the filmmaker receives any
significant returns. Compensating the production company
by means of a level 2 deferral also makes the insider
arrangement with a company that is wholly owned by the
limited partnership's general partner appear less onerous.
The offering memorandum should also discuss any
existing agreements that the filmmaker has entered into and
154. Level 2 deferrals are known as such because they are the second
deferrals paid, and because they are paid after the investors recoup their
investments.
155. See CONES, supra note 147, at 132.
156. See CONES, supra note 147, at 132.
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stress his authority as general partner to enter into any other
agreements on behalf of the limited partnership. The terms of
such agreements should be disclosed in detail. In the dual-
entity arrangement, the details of the arrangement with the
production company must be disclosed. The disclosure will
include the insider arrangement inherent in contracting a
production company whose sole shareholder is the financing
vehicle's general partner. The production company's lack of
experience should also be stressed. Additionally, the
purposes of the dual-entity arrangement1 57 should be
conveyed to the offerees.
The offering memorandum should discuss the agreement
by which the filmmaker acquired the rights to make the film.
This discussion should include what ancillary rights, if any,
were acquired in the agreement. Ancillary rights may include
the right to make sequels or television programs based on the
film, merchandising, the soundtrack, books, or other media.
The discussion should also disclose the copyright status of
such rights and the form of ownership, including whether the
rights are wholly owned or simply licensed to the financing
company.
The filmmaker should also make the investors aware of
any existing agreements with talent. If letters of intent, rather
than binding contracts, have been signed, the filmmaker
should alert investors that such letters are not binding. If any
firm agreements have been reached, the terms of such
agreements should be disclosed. Among other things, this will
include the duration of the actors' or director's commitment,
whether there is any commitment to promote the film or
whether the agreement ends at the completion of production,
and the terms of payment, whether up front, as a portion of
revenues or by deferral. If the filmmaker has obtained a
distribution agreement,1 58 it should also be discussed.
157. See supra pp. 7-8.
158. There are several types of distribution agreements. In a
production/finance/distribution agreement ("PFD"), a film company hires a
production company to produce a feature. The film company then finances and
distributes the film. Because distribution is such a specialized aspect of the
industry, and because the first-time filmmaker probably has no experience with
distribution, the finance limited liability partnership should not act as
distributor as well. Therefore, a PFD is not appropriate in this situation.
In a negative pick-up deal, the distribution company pays a fixed price
upon delivery of the film. Often, production companies will take the negative
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Distribution agreements have been described as follows:
The contract between a film's producer and its distributor
through which the distributor commits to distribute the
film in specified territories or throughout the universe, for a
set period of time (sometimes in perpetuity), and which
defines the other important terms including how and when
each party is to be compensated. 159
Since the distribution is the means by which the film will
reach the public, the distribution agreement is crucial to the
success of the film. 6° Every aspect of the distribution
agreement will therefore be material to an offeree's decision
whether to invest in the film.
Finally, the tax implications of the investment should be
discussed. Although there is an overview of the tax aspects of
the financing limited partnership in Section I supra,"6 ' tax
counsel should be consulted to address the tax implications
of the particular financing situation.
III
Conclusion
Film students are trained to appreciate films on an
artistic level, and to translate that appreciation into
pick-up deal and pledge it to a bank in order to obtain financing. A first-time
filmmaker may have difficulty obtaining, a distribution agreement, however,
because, like the studios, distribution companies may be hesitant to take risks
on unproven talent. In turn, they may hesitate to commit up front to payment
for the completed product.
In a pre-sale arrangement, a distributor agrees, prior to completion and
sometimes prior to commencement of production, to pay a fixed amount upon
delivery of a film in exchange for distribution rights for a particular country.
The distributor may also agree to pay overages; contingent payments based on
the film's success. A first-time filmmaker may thus be able to secure a pre-sale
arrangement under which a small amount is paid up front, and a potentially
significant amount will be paid via overages.
Another type of distribution agreement that may be available to first-
time filmmakers is a rent-a-system deal. Under this arrangement, the
filmmaker licenses certain film rights to the distributor and bears most of the
costs of distribution. In exchange, distributor takes a low distribution fee, with
the remaining revenues being to the filmmaker (or in this case the financing
company). This is probably the most attainable arrangement for first-time
producers, as the distribution company bears very little risk.
For a more detailed discussion of these and other distribution
agreements, see SCHUYLER M. MOORE, DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS,
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 369 (1998-99 ed.).
159. See CONES, supra note 147, at 147.
160. See MOORE, supra note 158, at 369.
161. See supra pp. 5-9.
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production of their own features. Generally, however, they are
not familiar with the business or legal aspects of production.
As shown above, these areas can be traps for the unwary. To
that extent, first-time filmmakers must be aware of the
complexities of the law and the marketplace in order to
produce a successful feature. Through proper attention to the
choice of entity and securities laws, they can effectively
overcome these hurdles and concentrate their energy on
production of a profitable feature.
